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MEND IT, DON'T END IT:
THE CASE FOR RETAINING THE DISINTERESTEDNESS
REQUIREMENT FOR DEBTOR IN POSSESSION'S PROFESSIONALS
Todd J Zywicki*
In the past few years, the "disinterestedness" requirement for counsel for
debtors in possession has been the subject of several high-profile and controver-
sial bankruptcy cases. Most famously, Weil, Gotshal & Manges was forced to
disgorge approximately $1 million dollars in fees which had been paid for their
representation of the debtor in In re The Leslie Fay Cos. bankruptcy case.' Since
the Leslie Fay case, however, several other high-profile cases have resulted in
extended disputes over the disqualification of counsel on disinterestedness
grounds. At least one other major New York law firm has been the subject of a
motion for disqualification and disgorgement of fees, in the amount of $1.8 mil-
lion.2 Although the problem is commonly linked in the public consciousness
with large New York law firms, similar problems have arisen in large cases else-
where, causing significant delay and disruption in those cases.' Moreover, sev-
eral of these cases have spilled over into the mainstream national press, bringing
* Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. J.D., University of Virginia; M.A.
(Economics), Clemson University; A.B., Dartmouth College. The author was a member of the faculty at the
Mississippi College School of Law when this Article was written, and he would like to thank the Mississippi
College School of Law faculty, students, and administration for their intellectual support and colleagueship
duiring his time there. This Article is dedicated to the fond memories of his time there. The author would like
to express his deepest appreciation to the Honorable Judge Edith H. Jones for her insights and contributions to
this Article. The author would particularly like to thank Susan Freeman, Scott Norberg, and David Skeel for
comments on prior drafts of this Article and would also like to thank to the Honorable Judge Carolyn D. King,
Chuck Wolfram, Elizabeth Holland, Susan Jensen-Conklin, Don Bernstein, and Gerald Smith for helpful dis-
cussions which made valuable contributions to the ideas contained herein. The author would also like to thank
the participants and audience at a panel discussion at the Fall 1997 meeting of the American Bar Association,
Section on Business Law. For financial support, the author would like to thank the Mississippi College School
of Law and the Law and Economics Center at the George Mason University School of Law. Finally, the author
would like to thank Glenda M. Rabom for her research assistance. Any errors, of course, are the author's
responsibility.
1. In reThe Leslie Fay Cos., 175 B.R. 525 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
2. See Milbank Tweed Hit With $100 Million Lawsuit, 31 BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, Issue 9, Oct. 14, 1997, at
A9; Should Milbank Tweed Be Required to Disgorge $1.8 Million Fee?, 31 BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, Issue 7,
Sept. 16, 1997, at Al; Paul M. Barrett, Prosecutor Probes Milbank Tweed On Possible Conflict, WALL ST. J.,
May 7, 1997, at B9 (discussing motion in Bucyrus-Erie Co. case to force Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy to
disgorge $1.8 million in legal fees because of failure to disclose conflict of interest); Kurt Eichenwald, Milbank,
Tweed Is Accused of a Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1997, at D2 (same).
3. See Conflict of Interest Questions Raised in Montgomery Ward Filing, 30 BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, Issue
25, July 22, 1997, at Al (discussing potential disqualification of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue from representing
debtor, Montgomery Ward); see also In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., No. 94-11474 (Bankr. M.D. La. Aug.
7, 1995) (unpublished opinion) (order disqualifying counsel for creditors' committee).
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them to the public at large4 and shaking the confidence of many observers in the
fairness and efficiency of the bankruptcy system.
For several years, many commentators have argued that the "disinterestedness"
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code should be eliminated for professionals
retained by a debtor in possession. Voices favoring change have become more
prominent in response to these high-profile cases. Although Leslie Fay and
Bucyrus-Erie are exaggerated examples, it is argued that similar problems regu-
larly arise on a smaller scale throughout the country. Requiring counsel for a
debtor in possession to be disinterested, it is argued, creates unnecessary confu-
sion and prejudices administration of the case. As a result, debtors in possession
are denied the opportunity to retain the most-qualified counsel, and the confu-
sion wrought by the current standard results in unnecessary and expensive litiga-
tion that can disrupt the efficient administration of the case.'
As a result of these various problems, it is argued, professionals retained by a
debtor in possession should not be subject to the disinterestedness requirement.
Indeed, early in its work, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission recom-
mended just such a revision to § 327, which would have eliminated the disinter-
estedness requirement for counsel for debtors in possession and replaced it with
a standard which disqualified counsel from representing the debtor in possession
only if he held an interest which was "materially adverse" to the estate.
7
In the end, however, this proposal was rejected by vote of the Commission, and
the disinterestedness requirement was retained for counsel for debtors in posses-
sion. The Commission instead proposed an amendment to § 1107(b) designed to
remedy one consequence of the disinterestedness requirement. In this Article, I
will argue that the Commission was correct in retaining the disinterestedness
requirement for counsel for debtors in possession and in recommending an
amendment to § 1107(b) to remedy the specific problem of debtor's counsel who
holds a de minimis unsecured claim or equity interest in the debtor for pre-peti-
tion services.'
4. See R. Craig Smith, Note, Conflicts of Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to Increase
Confidence in the Bankruptcy System, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1045, 1046 n.9 (1995) (listing several articles in
the New York Times and Wall Street Journal covering the disqualification debate in the Leslie Fay case).
5. See Smith, supra note 4, at 1046. Smith writes:
As one of the most profitable law firms in the country, as well as boasting the nation's largest law
firm bankruptcy practice, Weil, Gotshal has been involved in conflicts of interest battles five times
during the past three years. Noting these problems, the New York Times intimated in its coverage
that there may be something rotten at Weil, Gotshal, suggesting an unseemly connection between the
law firm's success and their repeated conflicts violations.
6. In Cajun, the judge noted that the motion to disqualify counsel for the creditors' committee "of necessi-
ty cause[d] the Cajun proceeding to come to a screeching halt" and resulted in a several month delay in the con-
firmation of a reorganization plan.
7. The proposal presented to the Commission recommended elimination of the disinterestedness require-
ment only for counsel for debtors in possession, not for counsel for a Chapter 11 trustee. Thus, counsel for
Chapter 11 trustees would have continued to be subject to the current disinterestedness requirement.
8. Indeed, some commentators have concluded that these scandals argue against, rather than in favor of,
loosening the restraints of disinterestedness. See Should Milbank Tweed Be Required to Disgorge $1.8 Million
Fee?, supra note 2, at A ll (statement of Phil Hendel); Letter from Jerry Patchan, Director, Executive Office for
United States Trustee, to National Bankruptcy Review Commission (May 14, 1997) (copy on file with author)
("Instead of improving public and creditor sentiment about the bankruptcy system, this proposal will engender
even more cynicism than exists today. We are not aware of any push by the public or the creditor body to change
the system along the lines recommend....").
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In Part I of this Article, I discuss the current statutory framework surrounding
the "disinterestedness" requirement and the relationship between the substantive
standards of the so-called disinterestedness requirement and the disclosure oblig-
ations imposed by the Federal Bankruptcy Rules. Part II discusses the purposes
furthered by the disinterestedness requirement as applied to professionals re-
tained by a debtor in possession. Part III discusses and rebuts the arguments
which have been advanced in support of eliminating the disinterestedness
requirement as applied to debtors in possession. Part IV discusses the recom-
mendations made by the Commission to cure specific problems caused by the
strict disinterestedness requirement by carving out specific exceptions to its
reach. Part V contains concluding remarks and thoughts for future action.
I. DEFINING "DISINTERESTEDNESS"
Under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a), a trustee "may employ one or more attorneys,
accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not
hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested per-
sonts, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee's duties under
this title."'9 Although § 327(a) refers only to a "trustee," by virtue of § 1107(a),
the powers and limitations of a trustee in retaining professionals also apply to
debtors in possession.1
Thus, as an initial matter, the interaction of § 327(a) and § 1107(a) gives the
debtor in possession power to retain professionals. But under § 327(a), counsel
for a debtor in possession must meet two requirements: (1) she must "not hold
or represent an interest adverse to the estate," and (2) she must be a "disinterest-
ed person[]." The term "disinterested person" is defined in § 101(14). Section
101(14) regulates two types of relationships.11  Subsections (A) through (D) reg-
9. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (1994).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "a debtor in possession shall have all the rights...
and shall perform all the functions and duties... of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter." The legisla-
tive history of § 1107 clarifies this by observing that it
places a debtor in possession in the shoes of a trustee in every way. The debtor is given the rights and
powers of a chapter 11 trustee. He is required to perform the functions and duties of a chapter II trustee
(except the investigative duties). He is also subject to any limitations on a chapter II trustee ....
H. REP. No. 595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 404 (1977); S. REP. No. 989 to accompany S.
2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1978). See also 124 CONG. REc. 11, 102, which notes that
throughout title 11 references to a 'trustee' are read to include other parties under various sections of
the bill. For example, section 1107 applies to give the debtor in possession all the rights and powers
of a trustee in a case under chapter 11; this includes the power of the trustee to operate the debtor's
business under section 1108.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) provides:
(14) "disinterested person" means person that--
(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider;
(B) is not and was not an investment banker for any outstanding security of the debtor;
(C) has not been, within three years before the date of the filing of the petition, an investment
banker for a security of the debtor, or an attorney for such an investment banker in connection with
the offer, sale, or issuance of a security of the debtor;
(D) is not and was not, within two years before the date of the filing of the petition, a director, offi-
cer, or employee of the debtor or of an investment banker specified in subparagraph (B) or (C) of
this paragraph; and
(E) does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or any class of creditors
or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or
interest in, the debtor or an investment banker specified in subparagraph (B) or (C ) of this para-
graph, or for any other reason ....
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ulate pre-existing relationships between debtor's counsel and the debtor.
Subsection (E), on the other hand, regulates relationships between the debtor's
counsel and third parties, such as creditors of the debtor. There has been some
criticism of subsections (A) through (D), but to the extent that they are problem-
atic, they are susceptible to discrete solutions.12 Subsection (E), however, has
been at the heart of the debate over disinterestedness.
In relevant part, subsection (E) defines a "disinterested person" as one who
"does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or any
class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect
relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor ... or for any other rea-
son . . . ." By its own terms, therefore, the statutory language of § 101(14)(E),
incorporated by reference into § 327(a), requires that any interest referenced be
material.
Despite the requirement in subsection (E) that the referenced connections be
"material," courts have construed § 101(14)(E) "rigidly." '" As a result,
§ 101(14)(E) has been applied as a "catch-all clause."' 5 In particular, the final
sentence of § 101(14)(E), finding a lack of disinterestedness "for any other rea-
son," has been characterized as being "broad enough to include anyone who in
the slightest degree might have some interest or relationship that would color the
independent and impartial attitude required by the Code.""6
In addition to requiring that professionals be "disinterested persons," § 327(a)
also requires that those professionals "not hold or represent an interest adverse to
the estate." Unlike the literal definition of "disinterested person," this provision
of § 327(a) contains no materiality requirement. Case law, however, has poured
this requirement that counsel have no interest adverse to the estate--regardless of
materiality--into the definition of § 101(14)(E). Thus, rather than directly con-
struing the "no adverse interest" requirement of § 327(a), case law has instead
applied this requirement in a round-about manner through § 101(14)(E)'s disin-
terestedness requirement. As a result, the term "disinterestedness" has come to
be refer to any interest adverse to the estate, creditors, or the debtor, regardless
of materiality. In this Article, reference to the term "disinterestedness" is to the
commonly-understood, strict definition created by case law. Regardless of
whether strict disinterestedness is rooted in § 327(a)'s prohibition against
12. For instance, subsection (a) states that a "disinterested person" is a person that "is not a creditor, an
equity security holder, or an insider." The Commission has recommended an amendment to § 1107(b) which
would mitigate the hardship caused by this provision when counsel is a de minimis creditor or equity holder.
See infra at Part IV
13. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(E) (emphasis added).
14. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 327.04[3][c] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996) (citing cases). This
was also the practice under the Bankruptcy Act. See Meredith v. Thralls, 144 F.2d 473, 475 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 758 (1944).
15. 3 COLLIER, supra note 14, 327.04[5][a] (footnotes omitted). See also Ethics: Is Disinterestedness a
Viable Concept? A Discussion, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 201, 216 (1997) (statement of Judge Charles
Clevert) (characterizing subsection (E) as a "bucket provision").
16. 3 COLLIER, supra note 14, 327.04[3][c]. See also In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc., 785 F2d 1249,
1255 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Codesco, Inc., 18 B.R. 997, 999 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("a 'disinterested' person
should be divested of any scintilla of personal interest which might be reflected in his decision concerning
estate matters").
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"adverse interests" or § 101(14)(E)'s "disinterestedness" requirement, however,
one thing is clear: the standard which has been applied has been strict and rigor-
ous and all reform proposals have argued for a more lenient standard.
Section 1107(b) clarifies the scope of the disinterestedness requirement as
applied to counsel for a debtor in possession: "Notwithstanding section 327(a)...
a person is not disqualified for employment under section 327 of this title by a
debtor in possession solely because of such person's employment by or represen-
tation of the debtor before the commencement of the case." 7
Although the debtor in possession is not required to be disinterested, it does
owe a fiduciary duty to the estate. 18 As the Supreme Court observed in Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, "if a debtor remains in posses-
sion ... the debtor's directors have essentially the same fiduciary obligation to
creditors and shareholders as would the trustee for a debtor out of possession."19
The scope of the debtor in possession's fiduciary duties are ill-defined, but one
thing is clear:
This fiduciary duty means that Estate Counsel may not act as a hired gun for the
DIP but instead must consider the instructions that he receives from his client to
ensure "[t]hat he or she is receiving valid instructions from a competent fiducia-
ry acting within the scope of the fiduciary's trust."2
The disinterestedness requirement also arises under § 328(c) in giving the
court authority to deny compensation if "at any time during such professional
person's employment ... such professional person is not a disinterested person,
or represents or holds an interest adverse to the estate with respect to the matter
in which such professional person is employed."'"
In addition to these substantive requirements, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure also impose certain disclosure requirements on those who would serve
as counsel to a trustee or debtor in possession. Under Bankruptcy Rule 2014, the
application by the debtor in possession for retention of counsel shall "state ... to
the best of the applicant's knowledge, all of the person's connections with the
debtor, creditors, and other party in interest. ." 22 In addition, the debtor's
17. 11 U.S.C. § 327(b) (1994).
18. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985); In re Marine Power &
Equip. Co., 67 B.R. 643, 648 (Bankr. WD. Wash. 1986); In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014, 1021 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1982); Tina L. Brozman, Introduction, 5 Am. BANKR. INsT. L. REv. at p. i (1997); C.R. Bowles, Jr. &
Nancy B. Rapoport, Has the DIP's Attorney Become the Ultimate Creditors'Lawyer in Bankruptcy
Reorganization Cases?, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 47, 52 (1997) ("It is beyond all speculation that DIPs man-
aging the affairs of a Bankruptcy Estate are fiduciaries."); id. at 53 (noting that majority rule is that DIPs "are
'officers of the court"' who have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the Bankruptcy Estate qua
Estate, including its creditors, equity interest holders, and possibly even other parties in interest"); Robert J.
Landry, III & James R. Higdon, Ethical Considerations in Appointment and Compensation of an Attorney for a
Chapter 11 Debtor in Possession, 66 Miss. L.J. 355, 358 (1996); Daniel B. Bogard, Liability of Directors of
Chapter 11 Debtors in Possession: "Don't Look Back -- Something May be Gaining on You," 68 Am. BANKR.
L.J. 155, 212 (1994); Brenda Hacker Osborne, Note, Attorneys'Fees in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: A Case
for Modified Procedures, 69 IND. L.J. 581, 588 (1994).
19. 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985).
20. Bowles & Rapoport, supra note 18, at 60 (quoting In re Rivers, 167 B.R. 288, 300 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1994)).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 328 (C) (1994).
22. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a).
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application "shall be accompanied by a verified statement of the person to be
employed setting forth the person's connections with the debtor, creditors, any
other party in interest . ,.3 Thus, like the strict disinterestedness requirement,
Rule 2014(a) requires full and frank disclosure of all "connections" that counsel
may have with the identified parties. The disclosure requirement of Rule 2014 is
independent of the substantive disinterestedness rules discussed above. Although
commentators have advocated a loosening of the substantive disinterestedness
requirement to disqualify counsel only for material and adverse conflicts of inter-
est, they have all advocated retaining the strict disclosure language of Rule 2014.
The expansive disclosure requirements of Rule 2014 have led some commenta-
tors to argue that an adequate solution to the problem would be to loosen the sub-
stantive standards of § 327, but to continue to retain the strict disclosure require-
ments of Rule 2014. As noted above, the disclosure requirements of Rule 2014
are independent of the substantive requirements of § 327. Thus, it has often been
stated that a failure to make a full and complete disclosure is sufficient standing
alone to disqualify counsel or deny fees, regardless of whether there has been a
violation of the substantive requirements of disinterestedness. 24
This threat of punishment solely for a failure to disclose, however, is a paper
tiger. In practice, courts are reluctant to punish a failure to disclose independent
of some underlying substantive violation. Even in the Leslie Fay case, despite a
blatant failure to disclose, the court still refused to disqualify debtor's counsel.
Indeed, the court did not even force a full disgorgement of fees, instead forcing
disgorgement only of fees and expenses directly attributable to the cost of the
examiner's investigations and of the failure to disclose. 25 The limited nature of
the sanctions imposed on debtor's counsel in that case has been characterized as
"damaging" and "let[ting] those guys off with a slap on the wrist."26 Indeed,
debtor's counsel in the Bucyrus-Erie case has already argued that the mild penal-
ty imposed in Leslie Fay provides precedent for a similarly mild sanction for the
failure to disclose in its case."
In practice, many courts have agreed with the Leslie Fay approach, forcing dis-
gorgement of fees only where the failure to disclose conceals an underlying sub-
stantive violation of disinterestedness. In fact where a mere failure to disclose
results in no identifiable harm to the estate, courts have been reluctant to punish
such a non-disclosure.
Courts have pointed to two reasons for their reluctance to require disqualifica-
tion and disgorgement of fees for mere failures to disclose, absent some underly-
ing breach of the disinterestedness requirement. First, it has been argued that in
some cases, disqualification would result in extreme hardship and expense to the
23. Id.
24. See Landry & Higdon, supra note 18, at 395. See id. n.157 (citing cases).
25. In reThe Leslie Fay Cos., 175 B.R. 525, 538 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
26. Should Milbank Tweed be Required to Disgorge $1.8 Million Fee?, supra note 2, at A12 (statement of
John Stark).
27. Id. at A 11.
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estate from replacing counsel at a late stage in the proceeding. 2 Second, it has
been argued that it would be inequitable to disallow fees for valuable work per-
formed where the nondisclosure does not relate to any substantive breach of the
disinterestedness requirement. 2 There are few cases in which a court has dis-
qualified counsel and/or forced a disgorgement of fees purely for a failure to dis-
close. In almost every case, the court also found the presence of a substantive
conflict of interest which would have disqualified counsel had it, in fact, been
disclosed.
It is understandable that courts will be reluctant to enforce strict disclosure
requirements where they find no tangible harm to the estate as a result of the
failure to disclose, and find that it would be inequitable and wasteful to disquali-
fy debtor's counsel or require a punitive disgorgement of fees. While these rea-
sons are persuasive on a case-by-case approach, the signals sent by this approach
are distressing. It rewards counsel who fail to disclose all connections. After all,
it is likely that these connections will never come to light. If they do, it is likely
that the court will refuse to disqualify counsel because of the expense and delay
to the estate which would result and permit the award of fees for actual benefits
conferred. Because of the low likelihood of detection and the mild nature of the
sanctions which might result from failure to disclose, it is likely that a loosening
of the substantive standards for disinterestedness will also result in professionals
shirking their duties to disclose fully. 30 In short, relying on courts to impose
sanctions for failures to disclose, absent any underlying substantive violations, is
a threat which is more apparent than real.
II. PURPOSES OF THE DISINTERESTEDNESS REQUIREMENT
Those who have advocated elimination of the disinterestedness requirement for
debtor in possession cases have uniformly advocated its retention in cases
involving Chapter 1 1 trusteeships. This suggests that disinterestedness serves
some valid function in bankruptcy. Therefore, it is important to understand the
purposes of the disinterestedness requirement to determine whether professionals
retained by a debtor in possession should be exempted from it.
The requirement that professional persons employed by a trustee have no inter-
est adverse to the estate was contained in former Bankruptcy Rule 215(a).3"
Under the Bankruptcy Act, only an attorney appointed to represent a Chapter X
trustee was required to be "disinterested," as that term was defined in former
28. See Leslie Fay, 175 B.R. at 538-39; In re Decor Corp., 171 B.R. 277, 284 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994).
29. See Leslie Fay, 175 B.R. at 539; In re National Liquidators, Inc., 182 B.R. 186, 197 (S.D. Ohio 1995)
(reversing bankruptcy court's order requiring complete disallowance of fees because full disallowance of fees is
"inequitable and draconian" where there is no underlying adverse interest and "no actual harm to the bankrupt-
cy estate"); In re Love, 163 B.R. 164, 170 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1993) (refusing to order complete allowance of fees
for failure to disclose where there were some benefits to the estate from counsel's services); In re Amdura, 139
B.R. 963, 980 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) (refusing to disallow fees in toto for failure to disclose and permitting
fees for services untainted by an underlying conflict and where the services benefited the estate); In re
Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 BR. 742, 762 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 742); In re Roberts, 75 B.R. 402, 412 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1987) (where equities outweigh the need for attorney discipline for failure to disclose conflicts, the law
does not require the denial of fees).
30. See Patchan, supra note 8, at 4.
31. See 3 COLLIER, supra note 14, at 327.04[2][a].
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Rule 1-202(c)(2). 32 Disinterestedness under the Act was defined similarly to the
current rigorous definition of disinterestedness under the Code. Section 327(a)
of the Code expanded the disinterestedness requirement to apply to all profes-
sional persons in all cases under the Code, regardless of whether a trustee is
actually appointed. I
As now applied to professionals employed by a trustee or debtor in possession,
the disinterestedness requirement is extremely strict. As a leading commentator
writes:
As a general principle, professional persons employed by the trustee should be
free of any conflicting interest which might in the view of the trustee or the
bankruptcy court affect the performance of their services or which might impair
the high degree of impartiality and detached judgment expected of them during
the administration of a case."
There are three primary justifications for the disinterestedness requirement.
First, "strict standards are necessary in light of the unique nature of the bankrupt-
cy process," a process which raises problems absent from other areas of the law."
Second, strict disinterestedness requirements are necessary to preserve public
and judicial confidence in the bankruptcy system.36 Third, strict disinterested-
ness requirements ensure that the ethical standards for bankruptcy practice do
not clash with state ethical rules. All three of these policy goals are applicable
regardless of whether a case involves a trustee or a debtor in possession.
A. Disinterestedness and the Bankruptcy Process
Strict disinterestedness standards are necessary because of the unique pres-
sures raised by the bankruptcy process.37 The trustee and his professionals are
required to act as fiduciary for the estate, its creditors, other parties in interest,
and the court, and not solely as the debtor's advocate. ' The disinterestedness
standard, therefore, is designed to insure that all issues relevant to the administra-
tion of the estate are properly raised and vented before the court. As such, disin-
terestedness is designed to eliminate any conflicts that might cause the trustee
and his professionals to favor one party over another, to "take it easy" on one
32. Id. at 324.04[3][a].
33. Id. (noting that this requirement "effects a change from prior law").
34. Id. at 327.04[4].
35. In re Consolidated Bancshares Inc., 785 E2d 1249, 1256 n.6 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing In re Cropper Co.,
35 B.R. 625, 629 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983)).
36. Id. (citing In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc., 20 B.R. 328, 334 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re
Envirodyne Indus., 150 B.R. 1008, 1018 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) ("It is clear that the standards of § 327(a) are to
be strictly construed due to the unique nature of the bankruptcy system. Multiple representations which may be
tolerable in a commercial setting after full disclosure are not permissible in the bankruptcy system." (citations
omitted)).
37. Heightened standards of disinterestedness are required in other areas of law where particular public
policy and fiduciary concerns make higher than usual standards necessary. See Louis S. Robin, Responses to
Ethics and Service Working Group Proposals Concerning Conflicts of Interests, 102 COM. L.J. 224, 225 (1997)
("placing counsel under a higher standard is not one reserved only for bankruptcy attorneys"); see also
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 11 U.S.C. § 78eee(B)(6); see also In re Blinder, Robinson & Co.,
131 B.R. 872, 878 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
38. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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creditor or group of creditors, or to refuse to pursue possible claims or avenues
of inquiry because of any direct or indirect pressures. 39 As one commentator has
observed, "[i]ndirect or remote associations or affiliations, as well as direct, may
engender conflicting loyalties. The purpose of the [disinterestedness] rule is to
prevent even the emergence of a conflict irrespective of the integrity of the per-
son under consideration."'I
After all, it is the creditors' money that we are talking about. 41 The fundamen-
tal reality of a reorganization case is that the debtor is buying its continued exis-
tence with someone else's money.' Creditors are being forced to forego payment
so that the debtor can spend it in hopes of reorganizing its operations--and pay-
ing its attorneys, accountants, and other professionals. It may be that creditors
are better off overall as a result of foregoing payment in the short-run in
exchange for a larger payoff at the end of the collective proceeding."3 This does
not change the fact, however, that the debtor is spending the creditors' money.
As a result, creditors are entitled to have debtors' professionals who will be free
of pressures to compromise the interests of some or all of them. As one court
has written, "[t]he jaundiced eye and scowling mien of counsel for the debtor
should fall upon all who have done business with the debtor recently enough to
be potential targets for the recovery of assets of the estate."44
Consider the creditor's perspective. As a creditor in a Chapter 11 case, you are
told that you cannot repossess whatever collateral you thought you could rely on
to be paid off if the debtor defaults. If you are unsecured, you get paid pennies to
the dollar on your claim, and if you were actually able to squeeze out some pit-
tance of a payment on your claim, you may have to give it back as a preference.
And, as the final indignity, not only do you have to pay your own attorney, you
have to pay the debtor's attorney as well! In some circumstances, you may your-
self go bankrupt while waiting to be paid. Moreover, while you sit there waiting
to be paid the tiny bankruptcy dollars that may or may not be forthcoming some-
day from this debtor, the debtor's lawyers submit and receive periodic payments
on a dollar for dollar basis for the work they have done, little of which you can
really verify. Although we bankruptcy lawyers patiently explain to creditors why
"it has to be done this way," they cannot be blamed for being somewhat skeptical.
From their perspective, the bankruptcy system looks like a big party thrown for
39. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.7:207, at 237 (1990) (noting that one purpose of per se rule in lit-
igation context is that otherwise clients and the public at large "will be disturbed by the sight of one lawyer dis-
loyally 'playing both sides of the street,' earning two fees, and "possibly pulling his punches"' (emphasis
added)).
40. 3 COLLIER, supra note 14, at 327.03. The treatise goes on to argue caution in the application of
§ 101(14)(E) in a prophylactic manner so as not to disqualify professionals on the basis of "[r]elationships
remote from the instant case which do not involve confidential information?' This qualification, however, does
not mitigate the danger of "conflicting loyalties" that might arise from direct and indirect pressures on even the
most ethical lawyers.
41. In re Rusty Jones, Inc., 134 B.R. 321, 333 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
42. See Scott F Norberg, Debtor Incentives, Agency Costs and Voting Theory in Chapter 11, 46 U. KAN. L.
REV. 507 (1998).
43. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY (1986).
44. In re McKinney Ranch Assocs., 62 B.R. 249, 255 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
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the debtor and bankruptcy professionals, where the creditors get little but the bill.
Under such circumstances, it is difficult to explain to creditors why we need not
be concerned about the disinterestedness of debtor's counsel. 5
Moreover, it will be extremely difficult for creditors to exert any real oversight
or control over the activities and fees of debtor's counsel. Many cases lack active
creditor's committees and active committee counsel, partly as a result of a lack of
confidence that the system is working. 6 In such cases, collective action prob-
lems result in inadequate oversight by creditors. Where secured creditors or
creditors' committees actually do take an active role in the case, their counsel
may lack an adequate incentive to scrutinize and object to professional fees
because of a fear that debtor's counsel will later do the same to them. In prac-
tice, therefore, there is rarely active oversight of debtor's counsel.
It has long been recognized that the participants in a bankruptcy proceeding
are entitled to demand disinterested counsel regardless of whether tangible harm
to the estate can be demonstrated. As Justice Douglas observed in the seminal
case of Woods v. City National Bank & Trust, "[w]here a[n attorney] was serving
more than one master or was subject to conflicting interests, he should be denied
compensation. It is no answer to say that fraud or unfairness were not shown to
have resulted." 7 Justice Douglas explained the reason for this prophylactic rule:
The incidence of a particular conflict of interest can seldom be measured with
any degree of certainty. The bankruptcy court need not speculate as to whether
the result of the conflict was to delay action where speed was essential, to close
the record of past transactions where publicity and investigation were needed, to
compromise claims by inattention where vigilant assertion was necessary, or
otherwise to dilute the undivided loyalty owed to those whom the claimant pur-
ported to represent. Where an actual conflict of interest exists, no more need be
shown. ... '
Thus, as Justice Douglas suggests, conflicts of interest in bankruptcy sound in
the duty of loyalty an attorney owes to his client, and this duty is compromised
wherever a conflict exists, regardless of its purported lack of materiality.
45. See Should Milbank Tweed Be Required to Disgorge $1.8 Million Fee?, supra note 2, at A12, in which
John Stark stated the following:
You know, the whole bankruptcy system is so mysterious to non-lawyers. When companies are in
financial distress, they literally hand over the entire management to these bankruptcy lawyers. In
the Bucyrus Erie case, we used to refer to the fact that John Gallene was running the company ...
and he really was. Management didn't do anything without talking to John Gallene. That is not
uncommon, and I don't know how you're going to change that phenomenon. So, if that is not going
to change, then you've got to make sure that these bankruptcy lawyers clean up their act.
See also Eichenwald, supra note 2 ("Such potential conflicts are particularly important in bankruptcies, where
the debtors' lawyers can play important roles in determining which creditors walk away with the most money,
and what advisers or financiers get sued for deals that pushed the company toward insolvency.").
46. See Patchan, supra note 8, at 3.
47. Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust, 312 U.S. 262, 268 (1941).
48. Id.
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The pressures raised by the bankruptcy system will be present regardless of
whether the estate is being administered by a trustee or a debtor in possession.
In fact, because the debtor in possession has inherent conflicts of interest and is,
by definition, not disinterested, this may caution in favor of requiring an even
stricter adherence to disinterestedness for the debtor in possession's professionals
than for a disinterested trustee.
B. Disinterestedness and Public Confidence in the Bankruptcy System
Disinterestedness is also critical to the preservation of public and judicial con-
fidence in the integrity of the bankruptcy system. There is a strong public inter-
est in the fair and efficient administration of the bankruptcy system. Large bank-
ruptcy cases may directly impact thousands of creditors and shareholders and
hundreds of commercial landlords. A large bankruptcy case may also impact
thousands of employees and tens of thousands of patrons and customers.
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code provides the court with broad equitable powers4 9
as well as arms debtors with massive powers to unilaterally affect the rights of
creditors and other parties in the case."0 As a result of these broad grants of
power to actors in the bankruptcy system, the public has a large interest in the
fair and impartial administration of the bankruptcy process. As a result, there
must always be vigilance to ensure that the public has confidence in the bank-
ruptcy system and that it is operated for the public benefit and not just to enrich
debtors and their professionals.
There is already a widespread public perception that the bankruptcy system is
nothing more than "a cash cow to be milked to death by [bankruptcy] profession-
als."" Whether accurate or not, this unquestionably is not an isolated opinion."
The disinterestedness of the estate's professionals is critical to the perception that
the bankruptcy system is being administered fairly and efficiently. 11 Again,
these concerns are present regardless of whether the estate is being administered
by a trustee or a debtor in possession.
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994), which reads:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party
interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any
determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent
an abuse of process. (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994) (automatic stay); and 11 U.S.C. § I 129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1994) (provid-
ing for "cramdown" of secured creditor's interest).
51. In re Chas. A. Stevens & Co., 105 B.R. 866, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
52. See Patchan, supra note 8, at 3 ("Recent literature continues to indicate limited confidence at best that
cases are administered for the benefit of the estate as opposed to the professionals in charge."). Judge Charles
Clevert has observed that
there is a segment of the public that doesn't like us. They don't trust courts, and they don't trust
lawyers. And why? Because they think that we're constantly scratching each other's back. They
think that people will say: "we have a rule and we're going to follow the rule," "wink-wink." And it
is because of that sentiment, that the political types, and in this case, Congress, said "we're going to
tell you that you must not have an adverse interest, and we're going to tell you again, in clearer lan-
guage, that we definitely don't want you to have an adverse interest."
Ethics, supra note 15, at 203-04.
53. Robin, supra note 37, at 226 ("the enforcement of higher standards enhances the profession").
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This perception that the bankruptcy system is especially prone to fraud and
abuse is not new, nor is it ill-founded. Indeed, in enacting the Bankruptcy Code
in 1978, Congress wrote against the backdrop of a long history of abuse and self-
dealing in the bankruptcy system. The House Report accompanying the 1978
Bankruptcy Code summarizes Congress' concerns and indicates that the prob-
lems caused by "the lack of true creditor control, and the cronyism of the 'bank-
ruptcy ring' are not new. They have plagued the bankruptcy system for many
years. The Bankruptcy Commission documented them in detail in its study, and
noted their persistence in the bankruptcy system for over forty years."5I4
As Justice Douglas observed in 1940, "[t]he history of fees in corporate reor-
ganizations contains many sordid chapters."55 In part, the "sordid history" to
which Justice Douglas referred was the tale of the "Bankruptcy Ring," a story of
corruption and in-breeding in bankruptcy practice which led to the reforms in the
Chandler Act intended to bring the system under control. 56
The notorious "bankruptcy ring" was first brought to light in the investigation
of William J. Donovan on behalf of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. The scale of cronyism, corruption, and misfea-
sance which Donovan discovered in the bankruptcy system shocked the courts
and the public and spurred Congress to action to clean-up the bankruptcy sys-
tem.
On March 21, 1929, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the
New York County Lawyers Association, and the Bronx County Bar Association
petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
requesting an investigation of the administration of bankruptcy practice in the
Southern District. This request resulted from a report and presentment of the
grand jury of the Southern District a month earlier and from disclosures in other
proceedings indicating that the administration of the bankruptcy law "was char-
acterized by serious abuses and malpractices on the part of attorneys, receivers,
trustees, appraisers, custodians, auctioneers, and other persons and associations." 7
On March 6, 1929, Judge Thomas D. Thacher launched an investigation of the
matter, and Donovan was selected as counsel for the three petitioning associa-
tions. 5 What he eventually discovered shook the bankruptcy system to its foun-
dations.
The Donovan Report concluded that the bulk of bankruptcy practice in New
York City was concentrated in the hands of approximately twenty-one law firms.
Through a process of cronyism and inbreeding, this small group of lawyers and
law firms led to rampant conflicts of interest and even cases of "outright theft."5 9
In the end, the investigation resulted in the indictment of twelve attorneys. One
54. See H. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 96.
55. Dickinson Indus. Site v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, 388 (1940). See also Louis S. Robin, Responses to
Ethics and Service Working Group Proposals Concerning Conflicts of Interests, 102 COM. L.J. 224, 225 (1997)
(referring to the "unfortunate history" that led to the enactment of the disinterestedness standard).
56. Dickinson, 309 U.S. at 388. Other examples of professional misbehavior prior to the Chandler Act,
including a discussion of Douglas's Protective Committee Report, are discussed in my companion Article in the
Symposium. See Todd J. Zywicki, Of Bubbling Pots and Bankruptcy Ethics: A Comment on Wolfram and
Smith, 18 Miss. C. L. Rev. 399 (1998).
57. Id.
58. See H. RPp. No. 595, supra note 10, at 97. Donovan conducted private and public hearings for over two
months, examining over 1000 bankruptcy cases and 4000 witnesses.
59. Id.
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attorney absconded and then committed suicide. Two pleaded guilty and
received jail sentences.'
The Donovan investigation further discovered that the situation in New York
City was not isolated. Based on studies in six different cities, the Donovan
Report concluded that "fundamental defects in administration are not restricted
to New York, but exist generally throughout the country."61
The Report identified several sources of these problems, including problems
arising from the combination of administrative and judicial functions in bank-
ruptcy judges and the underpayment of trustees and receivers. 2 But other prob-
lems identified in the Donovan Report remain so today, including the absence of
effective creditor oversight in many cases and the difficulties of policing con-
flicts of interest.
Many of these concerns persisted in different forms up to the passage of the
Bankruptcy Code. The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code observed that
at the time of the Bankruptcy Code, there was "a feeling among nonbankruptcy
practitioners that there is a 'bankruptcy ring' that has an inside track on all bank-
ruptcy matters, including the judges' favoritism." ' The Bankruptcy Commis-
sion further reported that "a relatively small group of lawyers controlled the
bankruptcy field. Those not within this group tended to regard them with suspi-
cion and distrust."
64
To the extent that the public comes to see the bankruptcy system as being oper-
ated purely for the benefit of bankruptcy professionals and debtors, confidence
in the bankruptcy system is eroded. If this cynicism becomes sufficiently wide-
spread, it could result in modifications to the system which will undermine its
flexibility and ability to achieve its legitimate ends.
C. Disinterestedness and State Ethical Standards
The third factor underlying a strict adherence to disinterestedness for counsel
is to ensure consistency between the ethical rules of the Bankruptcy Code and
the various state ethical rules. The ethical rules of the Bankruptcy Code have
never "fit" very tightly with state law ethical rules. This section briefly examines
the ethical rules of the ALI's Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, the
ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, and contrasts these rules with those of the Bankruptcy
Code. 6
There are two primary difficulties in adapting state ethical standards to the




63. Id. at 95.
64. Id. at 96.
65. A majority of states base their state ethics rules on the Model Rules, while others rely on the Model
Code or combinations of the two. See Joseph D. Vaccaro & Marc R. Milano, Note, Section 327(a): A Statute in
Conflict: A Proposed Solution to Conflicts of Interest in Bankruptcy, 5 Am. BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 237, 244 n.57
(1997).
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apply to bankruptcy proceedings to determine when a conflict arises and if the
conflict may be waived. Second, if the conflict can be waived in theory, there are
significant problems which frustrate the application of the non-bankruptcy stan-
dards to a bankruptcy case.
A fundamental question that remains unanswered is whether the bulk of mat-
ters which arise in a bankruptcy case should be classified as litigation or transac-
tional in nature. If bankruptcy is considered to consist largely of litigation-like
matters, then strict per se rules that are similar to the requirements of the Bank-
ruptcy Code will apply. If, on the other hand, most bankruptcy matters are con-
sidered to be more like transactional matters, then looser standards requiring
conflicts to be material would apply. Unfortunately, it is not readily apparent
whether bankruptcy proceedings should be governed by the general default ethi-
cal standards usually applied to transactional lawyers, or whether bankruptcy
proceedings should be governed by the stricter ethical standards traditionally
applied in litigation.
On closer inspection, however, analysis of applicable ethical codes and the
realities of the bankruptcy process compel the conclusion that bankruptcy mat-
ters should be treated as more similar to litigation and that most ethical codes
would consider them to be litigation matters. As a result, to ensure that bank-
ruptcy lawyers meet the minimum requirements of state ethical codes, the
Bankruptcy Code should continue to require adherence to disinterestedness.66
Under the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, the relevant sections are § 201, articulating the general standard gov-
erning conflicts of interest, and § 209, stating a special rule for litigation cases
and "situations, not involving litigation, in which significant impairment of a
client's expectations of the lawyer's loyalty would be similarly likely to litigation
settings." 7 Section 201 defines a conflict of interest as existing when there is "a
substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of the client would be materially
and adversely affected by the lawyer's own interest or by the lawyer's duties to
another current client, a former client, or a third person." '
By contrast, § 209 provides that absent consent of all affected parties, "a
lawyer in civil litigation may not . . . (2) represent one client in asserting or
defending a claim against another client currently represented by the lawyer,
even if the matters are not related."69 Thus, § 209 contains a special, per se rule
regarding representation of clients that are adverse to each other in civil litiga-
tion. 7 This per se rule is grounded in the "underlying assumption that litigation
66. See In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc., 20 B.R. 328, 337 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201 cmt. b (Rationale) (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996). See also Gerald K. Smith, Conflicts of Interest in Workouts and Bankruptcy Reorganization
Cases, 48 S.C. L. REV. 793, 838 (1997) ("there is sharp disagreement as to whether section 209(2) or section
21 should apply to the bankruptcy case as a whole").
68. RESTATEMENT § 201, supra note 67 (emphasis added).
69. Id. § 209.
70. See Smith, supra note 67, at 886 ("[Tlhe Restatement treats the duty of loyalty as absolute in so far as
the litigation rule, but flexible in other contexts.").
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involving the assertion or defense of a claim between two clients always creates a
'substantial risk' that the lawyer's representation of one client or the other will be
'materially and adversely' affected by the simultaneous representation of both
clients, even in unrelated matters."'"
The argument for applying § 209 in bankruptcy cases is similar to the reasons
stated above which militate in favor of retaining a strict disinterestedness require-
ment, including concerns that a lawyer may pursue a case less effectively out of
deference to another client72 and for public confidence in the integrity of the
legal system.73 Indeed, in many ways, these features are present even more dra-
matically in a bankruptcy case than in the typical civil case. As the House
Report on the Bankruptcy Code observed, "[b]ankruptcy is an area where there
exists a significant potential for fraud, for self-dealing, and for diversion of
funds. In contrast to general civil litigation, where cases affect only two or a few
parties at most, bankruptcy cases may affect hundreds of scattered and ill-repre-
sented creditors."74 What is relevant to the bankruptcy context is that if § 209
applies, then a lawyer may not represent one client in asserting or defending a
claim against another current client, even if the simultaneous representation is in
connection with unrelated matters, unless both consent.
Difficulty arises because most of the activity which takes place in a bankruptcy
case does not fit neatly into the binary categorization of litigation versus non-liti-
gation matters. In both volume and importance, most of the matters which arise
in a bankruptcy case contain both litigation and non-litigation elements. In sub-
stance, however, the litigation model best describes the bulk of bankruptcy activ-
ity, and as a result, the ethical standards applicable to litigation cases should
apply.
Very little of a typical bankruptcy case conforms to the classic definition of
"litigation" matters. In fact, only adversary proceedings fit the classic mold, but
contested matters are probably similar enough to also fall under the litigation
provisions."7 Even less, however, conform to the classic definition of transac-
tional matters. Most matters in a typical bankruptcy case involve "administra-
tive" matters, including the process of plan negotiation and plan confirmation. It
is the administration of the estate, and particularly the development and confir-
mation of a plan, that usually involves the most significant controversies and that
can have the greatest practical impact on the resolution of a claim. 7 These
"administrative" matters, especially plan confirmation, are almost always more
71. Ethical Considerations for Bankruptcy Professionals' Questions Regarding Impact of Proposed
American Law Institute Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 2-3 (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
72. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 67, at § 209 cmt. e (suing present client in unrelated matter).
73. See id. at § 209 cmt. c (clients aligned in opposition to each other).
74. H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549)
6050.
75. See Smith, supra note 67, at 886.
76. See id. at 893 (quoting statement of Judge Carolyn Dineen King at annual meeting of the American
Law Institute) ("And you draw a distinction in your language here between the administration of the case,
which sounds like sort of bookkeeping but is in fact where the heavy lifting is done in a bankruptcy case. So
my suggestion is that it is naive, I think it looks naive, to buy into this distinction.").
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important to the case than formal adversary proceedings and are interwoven
throughout the so-called administrative proceedings of the case. " Moreover, if
counsel is deemed to be disinterested for purposes of an "administrative" pro-
ceeding, but not for a contested matter, this will create an incentive for debtor's
counsel to settle or otherwise avoid such issues before they rise to the level of a
contested matter from which counsel might be disqualified. The results of these
settlements or other conflict-avoidance strategies by debtor's counsel, of course,
would be funded by other creditors who lack the leverage of a credible threat to
disqualify debtor's counsel. As a result, many of bankruptcy's routine "adminis-
trative" proceedings create the same tensions as formal litigation and should con-
tinue to be governed by the same ethical rules.78
The Restatement's ethical rules are similar to those of the ABA's Model Rules
and Model Code, which serve as the basis for state ethical rules.
Unless all parties give informed consent, the Model Code generally prohibits a
lawyer from accepting representation that "will adversely affect his judgment on
behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client."79 If the lawyer is requested to under-
take or to continue representation of multiple clients "having potentially differing
interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that his judgment may be
impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues the employment.""
The Model Code defines "differing interests" broadly to "include every interest
that will adversely affect either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client,
whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other interest."8 Moreover,
the lawyer "should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation."82
As with the Restatement, the Model Code's rules governing litigation matters
are even more strict. "A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple
clients with differing interests.. . ."" As for "potentially differing interests," the
Model Code observes that "there are few [litigation] situations in which [the
lawyer] would be justified in representing in litigation multiple clients with
potentially differing interests." 84 Outside of litigation, the Model Code recog-
nizes that it may be appropriate to serve multiple clients having potentially dif-
fering interests in matters, such as where "the interests vary only slightly" and "it
is generally likely that the lawyer will not be subjected to an adverse influence
and that he can retain his independent judgment on behalf of each client .... -85
The Model Rules retain rules which are more consistent with the maintenance
of the disinterestedness standard than its abandonment.88 Under Model Rule 1.7,
77. Even a confirmed plan results in a judgment which is then binding on all creditors and parties in inter-
est.
78. See Smith, supra note 4, at 1053 ("In general, all attorneys are subject to the ethical conflicts rules of
their respective state bars, which are in turn based upon either the Model Code or Model Rules.").
79. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-14 (1980); see also In re McKinney Ranch
Assocs., 62 B.R. 249, 253 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
80. MODEL CODE, supra note 79, at EC 5-15.





86. HAZARD, supra note 39, at 132.
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a lawyer is strictly forbidden from representing a client if the representation "will
be directly adverse to another client," unless she reasonably believes the repre-
sentation "will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client" and
each client knowingly consents after consultation. 87 Thus, for direct conflicts,
the representation is forbidden, regardless of materiality.88 For indirect conflicts,
however, the rule is somewhat more lenient. The representation is forbidden if it
"may be materially limited" by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to
a third person, or the lawyer's own interests."
What constitutes a "direct" conflict is defined relatively broadly and is certain-
ly broad enough to include much of what comprises a typical bankruptcy case.
Thus, the Comment indicates that "a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate
against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly
unrelated."8 " By contrast, the definition of indirect conflicts appears to be some-
what narrow. The Comment states, "[o]n the other hand, simultaneous represen-
tation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse,
such as competing economic enterprises, does not require consent of the respec-
tive clients."8 1 While the example of "competing economic enterprises" is obvi-
ously illustrative only, it suggests that most conflicts, such as those which cause
concern in bankruptcy, should be treated as direct conflicts and subject to the
rule governing direct conflicts.
Moreover, Model Rule 1.7(a) flatly prohibits representation of opposing parties
in litigation. 2 The Comment states, "[o]rdinarily, a lawyer may not act as advo-
cate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other
matter is wholly unrelated."8 3 The exceptions to this general injunction are nar-
row and turn on whether the interests are actually adverse in type, not on the
materiality of the adverse interest. 4
As this brief discussion suggests, a threshold question for trying to mesh the
ethical rules of the Bankruptcy Code with various state ethical rules is whether
bankruptcy proceedings should be governed by the strict per se rules applied to
conflicts in litigation, or whether they should be treated to the more generous
non-litigation rules. Regrettably, the drafters of the various ethical rules have by
and large ignored the difficulties raised by bankruptcy proceedings. Only the
Restatement has recognized that the problem even exists." Prior to the Third Re-
statement, the Restatement has traditionally been silent on the issue of whether
87. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1997).
88. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 39, at 132.
89. MODEL RULES, supra note 87, at Rule 1.7(b).
90. Id. at Rule 1.7 cmt. (Loyalty to a Client).
91. Id.
92. Id. at Rule 1.7 cmt. (Conflicts in Litigation).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. RESTATEMENT, supra note 67, at § 201 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1) (amended Oct. 31, 1996).
1998]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 18:291
bankruptcy ethics issues were governed by the general rule of § 201 or the stricter
litigation rule of § 209. Most evidence of intent, however, seems to point in the
direction that bankruptcy matters should be governed by the stricter standard of
§ 209.96
This traditional silence, however, was shattered--albeit irresolutely--during the
drafting of the Third Restatement. Early in the drafting process, it was proposed
that the Restatement be amended to make bankruptcy proceedings explicitly sub-
ject to § 201. After much debate and consideration, this proposal was rejected.
Instead, the drafters of the Restatement have decided to take "no position on the
applicability of Subsection (2) in the many situations that may arise in bankrupt-
cy."97 In light of this decision not to decide, it remains unsettled whether § 201
or § 209 controls in bankruptcy.98
Even if the stricter litigation standards apply, most state ethical rules are merely
default rules which may be waived if all affected parties consent. I But no waiver
of the disinterestedness requirements of the Bankruptcy Code is permitted. 100
Moreover, this is appropriate in that conflicts of interest rules are often made non-
waiveable 101 or difficult to waive102 where "the public interest in maintaining public
confidence in the legal system outweighs the interest of individual lawyers and
individual clients in freely contracting with each other."03 Because of the history
of ethical problems in bankruptcy, the structural features of bankruptcy cases
which make them prone to ethical abuse, and the central role played by the bank-
ruptcy system to the public, bankruptcy may present a situation where conflict of
interest rules should be non-waiveable. Finally, it is questionable whether a fidu-
ciary is even permitted to waive a conflict of interest. 104
96. See Smith, supra note 67, at 886 ("[T]he limited discussion of bankruptcy matters in Chapter 8 of the
Restatement suggested that a bankruptcy case is a variety of civil litigation."); id. (describing correspondence
with Professor Charles W. Wolfram, Reporter for the Restatement, which "made it clear that Professor Wolfram
viewed the filing of a bankruptcy case as the commencement of civil litigation"). Although bankruptcy issues
are mentioned only in passing in the comments to the Restatement, such references uniformly occur in the dis-
cussion related to § 209, implicitly suggesting that the matters would be governed by § 209. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 67, at § 209 cmt. d(iii) (Complex and multi-party litigation) (discussing conflicts of interest in bank-
ruptcy); id. Reporter's Note to Comment d(iii) (Complex and multi-party litigation) (citing cases discussing
conflicts of interest in bankruptcy); see also RESTATEMENT § 201 cmt. b (Rationale) (stating that § 209 applies,
rather than § 201, in "situations, not involving litigation, in which significant impairment of a client's expecta-
tions of the lawyer's loyalty would be similarly likely to litigation settings").
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOvERNtNG LAWYERS § 209 (Proposed Official Draft 1996), reprint-
ed in Smith, supra note 67, at 897. See also Charles W. Wolfram, The Boiling Pot of Lawyer Conflicts in
Bankruptcy, 18 Miss. C. L. Rev. 383 (1998) (discussing ALI's decision to take no position on conficts of inter-
est in bankruptcy).
98. Id. ("There is substantial disagreement whether various bankruptcy proceedings should be considered
under Subsection (2)."). The drafters of the Restatement should be applauded for at least recognizing that the
issue exists. There is no evidence that the drafters of the Model Code or Model Rules have even considered the
special problems raised by bankruptcy.
99. Under the Restatement, for instance, if the representation would give rise to a conflict of interest under
§ 201, then counsel is forbidden from undertaking the representation absent consent by "all affected clients and
other necessary persons."
100. See In re Envirodyne Indus., 150 B.R. 1008, 1016 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993); In re Amdura, 121 B.R. 862,
866 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); 3 COLLIER, supra note 14, at 327.04[7][a][i].
101. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8 (1997).
102. In criminal cases, for instance, it is more difficult for co-defendants to waive conflicts of interest to
have one attorney represent both of them. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1997)
(Conflicts in Litigation).
103. HAzARD, supra note 39, at 123.
104. See CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.2.4, at 348 (1986). Even if such a rule does not
apply in bankruptcy, the fiduciary nature of the debtor in possession's role may require that the waiver of the
conflict is permissible only if in the best interest of the estate, rather than merely the desire of the debtor.
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Even if waiver were permitted, it would often be difficult or impossible to
waive such conflicts in bankruptcy and remain true to the duty of loyalty owed
by an attorney to his clients. The difficulty of securing waivers in bankruptcy
cases manifests itself in two ways. First, it is not clear who the "client" is in
bankruptcy who needs to consent to the waiver. Second, even if it would be theo-
retically possible to identify who needed to consent to such a waiver, it may be
impossible as a practical matter to do so because consent would have to be forth-
coming from hundreds or even thousands of affected parties.
Under state ethical standards, a prerequisite for waiving a conflict is that the
client knowingly waive the conflict after consultation. As discussed above, the
client in a bankruptcy case is the estate as a whole. But for purposes of trying to
determine who must consent to the waiver, it is difficult to specifically identify
who is the "estate." Are all creditors and parties in interest collectively the
"client"? Until it is established who is actually the "client," it is impossible to
determine who must consent to the representation.
If the estate is the client, then under established ethical principles, all parties
who comprise the estate must give knowing consent to waive the conflict. In a
large Chapter 11 case, of course, this may require the consent of several hundred
or even thousand equity holders, creditors, and parties in interest. Securing
informed consent under such circumstances is simply unrealistic. 10
It is commonly argued that as a result of the inability to secure effective
waivers of conflicts of interest, such waivers should be excused in bankruptcy
cases. But this conclusion does not follow from the premise. In all other areas
of law, a failure to secure the waiver of a conflict bars the attorney from the rep-
resentation. The reason why the attorney is unable to secure the waiver is simply
irrelevant--the client could have genuine concerns, unfounded paranoia, or even
sheer spite. The bottom line is that the failure to secure the waiver prohibits the
attorney from undertaking the representation. It is not clear why a different rule
should apply in bankruptcy proceedings. In all other areas of the law, the failure
to secure a waiver disqualifies the attorney from the representation--it does not
entitle her to ignore the waiver requirement and undertake the representation
anyway. As a result, under established ethical rules, the inability to secure
waivers of conflicts should have the effect of barring the attorney from the repre-
sentation.
Alternatively, it is argued that as a result of these administrative difficulties,
conflicts in bankruptcy could be waived by providing the affected parties with
notice of the proposed representation and permitting it unless an affected party
objects. While this approach may provide a workable solution to the problem, it
is questionable whether it does so in a manner which is consistent with the pur-
poses of the conflict of interest rules.
Allowing conflicts to be waived in this manner reverses the usual burden for
waiving conflicts and ignores the duty of loyalty which supports the conflict of
105. See Smith, supra note 67, at 896 (reprinting statement of Mr. Brian Redding to the American Law
Institute).
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interest rules. Because of the duty of loyalty owed from an attorney to his
clients, conflicts can be waived only upon knowing and express consent by the
client after consultation. The proposed procedure, on the other hand, would
reverse this process by permitting the representation unless the client affirma-
tively objects to it. Thus, rather than putting the burden on the attorney to secure
an informed and consensual waiver, the proposed process would put the burden
on the client to object. It is difficult to see how reversing this burden is compati-
ble with the duty of loyalty owed by an attorney to his client.
Allowing conflicts to be waived as a result of the inaction of a client also
ignores the practical realities of the situation. The client in such a situation is
confronted with a situation where it lacks an adequate incentive to object to the
representation. It is just one creditor of many in the case, and it will have to
incur the costs of hiring another attorney and pursuing the objection unilaterally.
It is unrealistic and unfair to force any single creditor to bear this burden merely
to protect its right to conflict-free counsel. These collective action and free-rider
problems are insuperable.
It has been argued that as the representatives of the estate, the creditors' com-
mittee should be empowered to review and object to the proposed representation
on behalf of the body of creditors and parties in interest which comprise the
estate. Again, however, this ignores the fact that the attorney's duty to avoid con-
flicts of interest sounds in the duty of loyalty. 0 As a result, ethics rules general-
ly require the knowing consent of every client to waive the conflict. "7 While the
creditors' committee represents the body of unsecured creditors for many pur-
poses, its interests are not synonymous, and the creditors as a whole are entitled
to speak for themselves on many issues. "' Because of the importance of con-
flict-free counsel to the operation of the bankruptcy system, waivers of conflicts
should require the express consent of every creditor and party in interest.
Creating a system in which the ethical rules imposed in bankruptcy could be
less strict than those imposed under state ethics laws ignores the compelling rea-
sons discussed in Part II for requiring a stricter ethical standard in bankruptcy
cases than otherwise. It also would likely place attorneys in the awkward posi-
tion of complying with federal law, but being derelict in their duties under state
ethical rules. Mere compliance with the federal ethical rules would expose the
attorney to prosecution under state ethical standards. On the other hand, volun-
tary compliance with the stricter state ethical standards would frustrate the pur-
pose of creating the more lenient federal rules.
To avoid this incongruous result, state ethical rules arguably could be preempt-
ed by the Bankruptcy Code so as to protect bankruptcy lawyers who comply with
106. See HAZARD, supra note 39, at 121 ("Although all ... basic duties a lawyer owes to a client are impli-
cated in conflict of interest situations, the duties of loyalty and confidentiality hold center stage."); ("The duty
of loyalty is obviously heavily implicated in conflict of interest situations."). Id.
107. See id. at 123 ("Waiver of an important right is usually valid only if it is knowing and intelligent, how-
ever, and permitting a client to waive is generally conditioned upon the requirement of prior disclosure of the
conflict or 'consultation' with the client.").
108. For instance, simply because the creditor's committee gives its approval to a debtor's reorganization
plan, every creditor is given an opportunity to vote on the plan before it is confirmed, and if enough unsecured
creditors oppose it, then the opinion of the unsecured creditors committee is simply irrelevant.
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the more lenient federal standards. The drastic step of federal preemption in the
traditionally state-controlled area of professional ethics rules, however, should
only be undertaken for the most compelling reasons. 109 I am unaware of any
principled justification for singling out bankruptcy lawyers for preferential treat-
ment, as opposed to say, criminal lawyers, employment lawyers, or antitrust
lawyers who usually practice in federal court. Absent such a compelling reason,
holding bankruptcy lawyers to a lower ethical standard than other practicing
lawyers smacks of special-interest favoritism and should be eschewed.
III. ARGUMENT FOR ELIMINATION OF THE DISINTERESTEDNESS REQUIREMENT AS
APPLIED TO DEBTOR IN POSSESSION'S PROFESSIONALS
Despite these strong reasons favoring the continued application of the disinter-
estedness requirement to professionals representing debtors in possession, many
commentators have called for its elimination. Several arguments have been
advanced in support of the proposition. Upon closer scrutiny, however, none of
them adequately identifies the problem which is purported to exist with the cur-
rent system nor do they explain why the elimination of the disinterestedness
requirement as applied to debtors in possession is warranted. In support of the
call for eliminating the disinterestedness requirement, the following arguments
have been advanced: (i) the current application of disinterestedness to counsel
for debtors in possession was a drafting error in the Code; (ii) the debtor should
be entitled to its choice of counsel; (iii) there is an inability of debtors to find
adequate counsel with sufficient resources to execute fully all aspects of the
bankruptcy case; and (iv) the need exists to correct the current non-uniformity in
the application of disinterestedness standards throughout the country. None of
these alone or in combination, however, support the abandonment of disinterest-
edness. This Part of the Article discusses and critiques each of these separate
arguments in turn.
A. The Application of Disinterestedness to Professionals Retained by the
Debtor in Possession was a Drafting Error
The first argument in favor of repeal of the disinterestedness requirement as it
applies to professionals retained by the debtor in possession is that its initial
application was the result of a "drafting error" in the 1978 Code and was not
intended by Congress. 110 In particular, it is argued that the reach of § 1107 is
over-inclusive in that it accidentally results in the application of the disinterested-
ness requirement of § 327 to debtors in possession when it was intended to apply
only to professionals retained by a trustee. All available evidence, however,
points to the contrary conclusion.
109. Butner v. United States, 440 US. 48 (1979).
110. See Gerald K. Smith, Disinterestedness, ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. 1995-1996, at 639, 640 (William L.
Norton, Jr., ed. 1995).
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"The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statutory provision]
begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute
itself." Section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code clothes the debtor in possession
with all of the rights and powers as a trustee, subject to the same restrictions. 112
Thus, under the plain language of the statute, the debtor in possession has the
power to employ professionals, but those professionals must be disinterested and
hold no interest adverse to the estate. Thus, by the plain language of the statute,
the disinterestedness requirement applies with full force to professionals retained
by a debtor in possession. "In this case it is also where the inquiry should end,
for where, as here, the statute's language is plain 'the sole function of the courts
is to enforce it according to its terms."" 3
Application of the plain language rule is even more apropos in a situation,
such as this, where the alleged drafting error is supposedly what Congress has
not written by a failure to explicitly except counsel for a debtor in possession
from the disinterestedness requirement. This is a far bolder argument than the
typical scenario where a scrivener's error results in a misstatement, and the mis-
statement results in irrational results which plainly contradict congressional
intent. Here, there is no statement at all and no basis to believe that Congress
ever intended to make such a statement. Indeed, it is only as a result of the cross-
reference between § 327 and § 1107 that a debtor in possession has authority to
employ counsel in the first place. 1' The idea that Congress meant to give the
debtor in possession power to employ counsel under § 327(a), but then just "for-
got" to exclude them from the reach of the disinterestedness requirement of
§ 327, is a remarkable proposition which requires significantly greater support
than has been forthcoming.
Contextual evidence reinforces the textual reading of the statute. 115 Section
1107(b) specifically refers to the applicability of § 327(a) to a debtor in posses-
sion 1" and explicitly carves out an exception to the application of § 327(a) to a
111. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
112. Gerald Smith has argued that the report of the Commission of the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States supports the concept that the disinterestedness requirement was not supposed to be applied to the debtor
in possession. Smith, supra note 110, at 640. The evidence he cites for this proposition, however, is inapplica-
ble to the question of whether professionals retained by the debtor in possession must be disinterested, in that
he cites the report as it relates to the retention of professionals for a "special purpose:' See id. at 641 n.16. The
ability to retain non-disinterested professionals for a "specified special purpose" is governed by § 327(e), not §
327(a), and applies equally to trustees and debtors in possession. Thus, the evidence cited is irrelevant to the
intent of § 327(a). Even if it were, it would provide evidence of an intent to apply the disinterestedness stan-
dards differently to trustees and debtors in possession, in that § 327(e) applies equally to both.
113. Ron Pair 489 U.S. at 241; see also Todd J. Zywicki, Cramdown and the Code: Calculating Cramdown
Interest Rates Under the Bankruptcy Code, 19 T. MARSHALL L. RE. 241, 247 (1994).
114. Thus, it is simply incorrect to claim, as has one commentator, that "no reasonable inference that there is
[a disinterestedness requirement] emerges from a literal reading of relevant provisions," as the textual argument
for the applicability of the disinterestedness requirement arises from the same source as the authority of the
debtor in possession to employ counsel in the first place. Lieb, infra note 162, at 106. Similarly, it is illogical
to argue that "section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code was carefully written so as to apply to professionals serv-
ing a 'trustee,"' unless one also intends to suggest that debtors in possession have no authority at all to employ
professionals at all. Id. at 119.
115. See United States Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)
("Statutory construction.., is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often
clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme... "); see also Zywicki, supra note 113, at 248.
116. See § 1107(b) ("Notwithstanding section 327(a) of this title, a person is not disqualified for employ-
ment under section 327 of this title by a debtor in possession .... ").
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debtor in possession. 7 It should go without saying that it would be unnecessary
to carve out an exception to § 327(a) specifically with respect to a debtor in pos-
session if that requirement did not apply to a debtor in possession in the first
place. 18 Thus, the plain language of the statute is reinforced by contextual evi-
dence which indicates that the disinterestedness requirement was intended to
apply to a debtor in possession's professionals. 119
The "drafting error" argument, therefore, actually requires the existence of a
triple drafting error: the "inadvertent" failure to exclude debtors in possession
from the reach of the disinterestedness requirement in § 327(a), plus the "inad-
vertent" reference to § 327(a) in the introductory clause of § 1107(b), plus the
specific reference to the debtor in possession in § 1107(b). By contrast, there is
no text, context, or legislative history which suggests that Congress intended to
exempt professionals employed by a debtor in possession from the reach of the
disinterestedness requirement. At some point, piling one purported drafting
error upon another causes the "drafting error" argument to collapse in a heap of
implausibility.
The only evidence of congressional intent to which advocates of the "drafting
error" argument have pointed is that applying the disinterestedness requirement
to the debtor in possession's professionals enacted a change from Chapter XI of
the Bankruptcy Act. Under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, the disinterested-
ness requirement applied only to a trustee and his professionals, and not to pro-
fessionals for a debtor in possession. 120 It is further argued that this practice was
changed "accidentally" through the unintended interaction of § 327 and § 1107.
Citing the canon of construction stated in Midlantic National Bank, 2 it has been
argued that Congress could not have intended to make such a "major departure
from the prior law" without some specific legislative history or other indicia to
indicate that Congress intended to make such a change. 22
This argument misunderstands the Supreme Court's holding in Midlantic and
the degree to which pre-Code practice is relevant in construing the plain lan-
guage of the Bankruptcy Code. As the Supreme Court wrote in Ron Pair
Enterprises, "[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in
the 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters."' 23 Such evidence of
117. See id. (excluding from § 327(a) disqualification because of "such person's employment by or repre-
sentation of the debtor before the commencement of the case").
118. Indeed, Gerald Smith has admitted that "it can be inferred... from § 1107(b) that Congress intended to
bring the employment of counsel for the debtor in possession under § 327." Smith, supra note 110, at 643.
119. It has been suggested that this reference in § 1107(b) is simply superfluous, and that there was no pur-
pose behind this provision in § 1107(b) which calls off the applicability of § 327 in the stated circumstances.
See Smith, supra note 110, at 643. But this argument that Congress inserted a provision that had no purpose
and was pure surplussage is simply implausible when compared to a reading of the statute which gives those
provisions a logical reading.
120. Id.
121. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986).
122. Richard Lieb, The Section 327(a) "Disinterestedness" Requirement-Does a Prepetition Claim
Disqualify an Attorney for Employment by a Debtor in Possession?, 5 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 101, 110
(1997); Smith, supra note 110, at 643-44.
123. United States v. Ron Pair Enters. Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
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contrary intent may be inferred if the textual meaning conflicts with other sec-
tions of the Code, with important state or federal interests, or with legislative his-
tory. 124 Here, as in Ron Pair Enterprises, the textual requirement that profession-
als retained by a debtor in possession be disinterested does not conflict with any
other sections of the Code, with important state or federal interests, or legislative
history. "[A]s long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there gen-
erally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute."12
As Ron Pair makes clear, pre-Code practice is useful only in limited circum-
stances. Pre-Code practice is illuminating only where the court makes the initial
determination that the plain meaning of the text is ambiguous and inconsistent
with "other provisions of the Code itself," or other indicia of congressional
intent. 12 Thus, pre-Code practice provides "interpretive assistance" only where
"a literal application of the statute would be 'demonstrably at odds with the inten-
tions of its drafters."'127 Thus, there is no "pale presumption" that pre-Code prac-
tice is always relevant. '28 Where the "natural interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage does not conflict with any significant state or federal interest, nor with any
other aspect of the Code," nor with any other evidence of legislative intent,
"[t]here is no reason to suspect that Congress did not mean what the language of
the statute says."' 29  As there is no evidence that applying the disinterestedness
requirement to a debtor in possession's professionals produces unreasonable or
irrational results clearly at odds with congressional intent, Midlantic is simply
irrelevant, and the plain language of the statute should be applied.
Moreover, even if pre-Code practice were relevant here, the limited role afford-
ed to it by the Midlantic exception does not justify ignoring the plain language of
the statute. The change made in this case hardly constitutes a "significant"
change from prior practice. Moreover, this doctrine properly applies only where
the preexisting doctrine is judicially-created; it is not an appropriate canon to
apply where the Code provision simply overrules a prior legislative provision. 130
Even if this were considered to enact a "significant" change in the law, the
absence of legislative history is largely irrelevant in light of the presence of mul-
tiple other indicia of congressional intent. 131
Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act were combined into a single Chapter
11 under the Bankruptcy Code. In creating this synthesis, the Code drew from
some aspects of Chapter X practice and some aspects of Chapter XI practice.
124. Id. at 243.
125. Id. at 240-41.
126. Id. at 244. There is no claimed ambiguity in the statutory language here.
127. Id. at 244.
128. Id. at 245.
129. Id. at 245-46.
130. See id. at 245 ("Kelly and Midlantic made clear that, in an appropriate case, a court must determine
whether Congress has expressed an intent to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept in enact-
ing the Code." (emphasis added)).
131. See id. at 240, stating that
it is worth recalling that Congress worked on the formulation of the Code for nearly a decade. It was
intended to modernize the bankruptcy laws, and as a result made significant changes in both the sub-
stantive and procedural laws of bankruptcy .... In such a substantial overhaul of the system, it is not
appropriate or realistic to expect Congress to have explained with particularity each step it took.
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The plain language of the Code evidences an intent by Congress to carry over to
all cases the disinterestedness requirement for trustees appointed pursuant to
Chapter X. After all, Chapter X was created by the Chandler Act to cleanup the
reorganization process for large publicly-held corporations which had been
marked by widespread graft, corruption, and criminality.
Given the success of the Chandler Act reforms in weeding out corruption, and
given further that most cases under the Code would be administered by a debtor in
possession rather than a trustee (including, especially, large cases which had been
administered by a disinterested trustee under Chater X), there is every reason to
believe that Congress intended to carry over the disinterestedness requirement and
apply it to debtors in possession under the Code. Thus, it is questionable whether
the change could even be said to constitute a "significant" change at all, as it just
illustrates an expansion of Chapter X practice into a new, but similar, situation.
By contrast, there is simply no evidence to suggest that Congress intended in the
Code to return in most cases to a system similar to that which had spawned the
corruption and fraud which preceded the enactment of the Chandler Act.
As noted above, Congress did not write on a clean slate in this area. Instead,
Congress evidenced an awareness of the traditional ethical problems which had
plagued the bankruptcy system and the structural difficulties which made the bank-
ruptcy system especially prone to abuse and self-dealing. 132 The well-publicized
findings of the Donovan investigation and Douglas's protective committee investi-
gation, and the recognition that similar problems of conflicts of interest and a
"bankruptcy ring" persisted even at the time of the Bankruptcy Code, belies the
argument that there is no history or legislative history to support the view that
Congress intended to apply the disinterestedness requirement to counsel for a
debtor in possession.
By contrast, there is every indication that Congress believed that many of the
Chandler Act reforms succeeded in cleaning up troublesome aspects of the bank-
ruptcy system. Among these reforms had been the application of the disinterest-
edness requirement, especially in large cases. The "sordid history" of bankruptcy
practice in America presents ample evidence that Congress intended to apply the
disinterestedness requirement to professionals employed by debtors in possession
under the Code. Rather than evidencing a lack of consideration by Congress of
the issue, therefore, the lack of legislative history specifically referring to the
change probably indicates consensus support for the extension of disinterested-
ness to the debtor in possession and an absence of controversy on the topic.
B. Protection of the Debtor s Right to Choose Counsel of its Choice
It is also argued that requiring counsel for the debtor to be disinterested unduly
interferes with the right of the debtor to choose counsel of its choice. This argu-
ment is usually raised in the context of allowing the debtor to continue using the
counsel that it had pre-petition because (1) the debtor has the same right as any
132. See supra notes 45-64 and accompanying text.
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other party to retain counsel of its choice; and (2) the ability to retain pre-petition
counsel will reduce administrative costs to the estate since counsel will be famil-
iar with the debtor and its business. To the extent that strict application of the
disinterestedness requirement interferes with the ability of the debtor to hire
counsel of its choice, it is argued that this works an unnecessary hardship on the
debtor and works to the detriment of the estate. This argument does not justify
repeal of the disinterestedness requirement as applied to counsel for the debtor in
possession.
It is argued that the right to employ counsel of one's choice is a bedrock princi-
ple of the American legal system, predicated on the adversary system. "A DIP in
a bankruptcy case should have substantial freedom to choose its own attorney.
Under our system of jurisprudence, a party should be able to select an attorney of
its choice. This is true in both civil and criminal cases."'33 "Consequently," it is
concluded, "a DIP should be able to pursue avenues of its own with professionals
of its own choice, even if those professionals are not disinterested. It should be
able to retain a professional of its first choice, not its second or third choice."'
' 34
But the right of the debtor to retain counsel of his choice is not unfettered once
the debtor files for bankruptcy relief. The debtor and its professionals have a
fiduciary duty to all parties, not just the debtor. If the debtor were paying for its
counsel out of its own pocket, then it would be reasonable to allow it full discre-
tion to choose counsel. But the debtor is not spending its own money--it is
spending the creditors' money. As a result, the debtor's private right to retain
counsel of its choice must be consistent with the systemic and public policy
goals of the bankruptcy system. Given the choice of several disinterested coun-
sel, the debtor's choice should be honored. This observation, however, does not
support allowing the debtor to retain non-disinterested professionals. 135
Moreover, this begs the central question of why a debtor in possession should
have an unfettered right to choose counsel of its choice, but a trustee should not.
Should not a trustee also be entitled to "retain a professional of its first choice,
not its second or third choice"? It is recognized that when a trustee is appointed,
his discretion in choosing counsel is limited. This suggests a broader principle--
the right to employ counsel of one's choice is often limited, especially in bank-
ruptcy, by other goals of the legal system. Thus, there is nothing illogical about
limiting the discretion of a debtor in possession to choose counsel of its choice,
as trustees suffer under the same limitation.
It is also argued that permitting the debtor to retain pre-petition counsel--even
if not disinterested--will reduce the administrative expenses of the estate because
that counsel will already have a working knowledge of the debtor and its busi-
ness. 136 As an initial matter, this observation rests on a questionable empirical
foundation. In many cases, the counsel which the debtor in possession seeks to
133. Lieb, supra note 122, at 123 (footnotes omitted).
134. Id. at 112.
135. See In re Envirodyne Indus., 150 B.R. 1008, 1018 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993).
136. See Lieb, supra note 122, at 123.
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hire will have no pre-existing relationship with the debtor; thus, no administra-
tive expenses will be saved by permitting the debtor to hire that counsel. 37
Leaving aside the accuracy of the assumption that disinterestedness generally
disqualifies the debtor in possession's pre-petition counsel, this argument suffers
from logical flaws as well. Under this logic, a Chapter 11 trustee should also be
able to retain the debtor's pre-petition counsel, even if not disinterested. After
all, the trustee will have significantly less of a working knowledge of the busi-
ness than would the debtor in possession. As a result, the trustee would have an
even greater need to be able to retain pre-petition counsel so as to learn about the
debtor's business. Nonetheless, no one has proposed eliminating disinterested-
ness to allow a Chapter 11 trustee to retain non-disinterested counsel. Thus, if
this rationale is not sufficient to justify abandonment of the disinterestedness
requirement for a Chapter 11 trustee, it is difficult to understand how it justifies
its repeal in the weaker case of a debtor in possession. Indeed, precisely because
the debtor in possession is interested, this suggests an even more compelling case
that its counsel should be disinterested. l3
C. The Inability to Find Competent Counsel and the Inability to Obtain Waivers
In most large bankruptcy cases, the debtor remains in possession of its estate
throughout the case. The larger and more complicated the case, the greater the
need for sophisticated and competent counsel with sufficient ability and re-
sources to administer these cases in an efficient manner. As a result, it is argued
that especially in these large, complex cases, the resources of a large law firm are
necessary to properly represent the debtor. 139 Often, however, the debtor's pre-
ferred counsel will have as a client one or more of the debtor's creditors or some
other party in interest. As a result, under the strict disinterestedness standard of
the Code, it is argued that all large firms (and, hence, all qualified counsel) will
be disqualified from representing the debtor. Moreover, these large firms either
cannot or will not be able to get waivers from clients with which a conflict of
interest may exist. It is concluded that as a result of the strict disinterestedness
requirements of the Code, the debtor will be unable to secure adequate represen-
tation, thereby harming the estate and its administration." 0
This argument is based on an empirical question. The proponents of this argu-
ment have advanced no empirical evidence to demonstrate that any debtors in
possession have been forced to "make do" without qualified counsel in a large,
137. See Ethics, supra note 15, at 214 (statement of Joel Pelofsky) (noting that Weil, Gotshal had no pre-
existing relationship with the debtor in the Leslie Fay case).
138. See id. at 208 (statement of Joel Pelofsky) ("because the old management is not disinterested, there has
to be some curb on that management's ability to go in and do whatever it wants to do for the benefit of the prep-
etition entity").
139. See Smith, supra note 67, at 898 (quoting statement of Sheldon H. Elsen to the annual meeting of the
American Law Institute).
140. See 3 COLLIER, supra note 14, 1 327.03, (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996), which states as follows:
Past experience has shown that in large chapter 11 reorganization cases with widespread creditor
interests, it has become increasingly difficult to obtain the services of competent counsel with
offices sufficiently staffed to handle all of the varied legal services required in the case, who could
meet the strict requirements of "disinterestedness."
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complicated case. 141 Nor has there been any evidence of harm to debtors or the
bankruptcy system caused by the purported disqualification of "all" counsel
with sufficient resources and ability to carry out a given case. Even if there have
been such incidents, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that it is a suffi-
ciently large problem to justify the abandonment of the disinterestedness require-
ment and its benefits. Finally, while such a scenario may have been plausible
several years ago, the multiplication of large bankruptcy cases and widespread
development and dissemination of bankruptcy expertise across the legal profes-
sion makes it virtually inconceivable that the application of disinterestedness
would disqualify all counsel with sufficient ability. 142
One suspects that the proponents of this argument are not so much concerned
that a debtor in possession will be forced to go without competent counsel to the
detriment of the estate. Instead, it appears that this concern is animated by a
sense that the disinterestedness requirement falls disproportionately hard on
large law firms who will often have as clients large lenders and other creditors
who the firm will be representing in other, unrelated matters.
As more and more large companies have sought the relief of Chapter 11, more
and more large firms that traditionally eschewed bankruptcy practice have gotten
into the game. 143 The increased size and frequency of these cases, combined
with other changes in the 1978 Code which raised the fees which could be
earned for bankruptcy work, has "mad[e] Chapter 11 more lucrative, and large
firms were lured into the practice.""" Because the disinterestedness requirement
has a greater impact on large firms than others, even though it does not work to
disqualify all firms, it does tend to disqualify large firms at a disproportionate
rate. "I
It has also been argued that to the extent that a conflict is caused by one or a
few specific conflicts, this problem can be cured by hiring special counsel pur-
suant to § 327(e). But this is not an adequate solution for two reasons.
First, if it is known at the outset of the case that counsel has conflicts that will
require appointment of special counsel, then it is simply a knowing duplication
of administrative expenses to appoint such counsel with the understanding that
special counsel will also be appointed, as opposed to simply appointing disinter-
ested counsel from the outset of the case.
Second, it will often be during the case that facts will come to light that give
rise to a conflict, and debtor's counsel at that time will have to make a judgment
141. See Patchan, supra note 8, at 3 ("We are not aware of any case in which a debtor was unable to obtain
competent representation because of the disinterestedness rules.").
142. See Ethics, supra note 15, at 214 (statement of Joel Pelofsky) (arguing that "to some degree talent is
fungible" and that "there are a lot of people out there who are talented").
143. Luther Brickman & Jonathan Klein, The Use of Advance Fee Attorney Retainer Agreements in
Bankruptcy: Another Special Law for Lawyers?, 43 S.C. L. REv. 1037, 1060 n.103 (1992); Ethics, supra note
15, at 209 (statement of Judge Charles Clevert).
144. Nina Martin, Boom Times for Bankruptcy, A.B.A.J., Dec. 1991, at 82, 83.
145. Similarly, one suspects that the lack of concern over the application of disinterestedness to Chapter 11
trustees is primarily a function of the fact that such cases usually are relatively small and generate little in the
way of fees, rather than on a principled distinction between debtors in possession and trustees.
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as to whether further investigation is warranted. The same forces that make it
undesirable to rely on interested counsel to bring such an action will also make it
undesirable to rely on interested counsel to undertake further investigation of the
matter or to refer the matter to outside counsel.
That conflicts of interest can infect the initial decision to undertake further
investigation into a matter is highlighted by the Leslie Fay case. 146 In that case,
counsel for the debtor in possession failed to disclose to the court that it repre-
sented not only the debtor in possession, but also certain targets (Michael L.
Tarnopol and Steven Friedman) of an audit committee investigation into alleged
accounting irregularities. 147 Although the court's holding turned, in part, on the
failure to disclose those relationships, the foundation of the court's decision was
the belief that the relationships would interfere with counsel's ability to impar-
tially and thoroughly investigate the allegations against those parties so as to
determine whether further action against them was warranted. As the court
observed, "[debtor's counsel] had a perceptible economic incentive not to pursue
the possibility of claims against Tarnopol and Friedman with the same vigor and
intensity it might have otherwise applied."'"
In response to this conclusion by the court, debtor's counsel contended that it
investigated the allegations and concluded that no viable claims against Tarnopol
and Friedman existed, and as a result, there was no adverse interest and conflict
requiring disclosure. 149 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the con-
flicts interfered with the impartiality of the preliminary investigation into whether
further action was warranted. "0
Similar concerns were expressed by the Eleventh Circuit in denying fees to the
law firm of Sirote & Permutt and requiring complete disgorgement of fees in In
re Prince. ' In Prince, the law firm performed estate planning services for
Prince, who later filed bankruptcy, and his wife. At the same time that the law
firm was representing Prince, it was also representing Prince's company, PBR
Electronic, Inc. Five months prior to Prince filing an individual Chapter 11 case,
Sirote & Permutt provided estate planning services to Prince which enabled him
to convey approximately $600,000 in property to Mrs. Prince for no valuable
consideration. Sirote & Permutt was later retained by Prince for his bankruptcy
case. At the outset of the case, Sirote & Permutt filed a statement pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rule 2014 which stated that the law firm had no connection to the
debtor. The law firm's assistance in effectuating the $600,000 transfer later came
to light, and Sirote & Permutt withdrew as Prince's counsel. On appeal to the
Eleventh Circuit, the court held that it was justified to force Sirote & Permutt to
disgorge all fees already paid in the case and to pay no further fees.
146. In reThe Leslie Fay Cos., 175 B.R. 525 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1994).
147. Id. at 529.
148. Id. at 534.
149. Id.
150. Id. The court noted, for instance, that debtor's counsel placed undue reliance on the testimony of an
unreliable witness and reached its conclusion that no further action was warranted before the final results of an
audit committee report were in. Id.
151. Electro-Wire Prods, Inc. v. Sirote & Permutt, P.C., 40 E3d 356, 359 (11 th Cir. 1994).
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The Eleventh Circuit's primary concern was that the lack of disinterestedness
on the part of Sirote & Permutt "demonstrate that the conflicts of interest which
Sirote labored under clearly prejudiced the Debtor's estate. By representing Prince
in his bankruptcy proceedings, Sirote deprived Prince of a conflict-free, impartial,
independent evaluation of the potential claims of and against his estate."' 52 The
court stated that it was beside the point whether the $600,000 transaction was
actually a fraudulent conveyance. Instead, what was critical for the court was
that conflict-free, disinterested counsel was necessary to determine whether the
claim was worth pursuing. 15 As the court observed, "because we find Sirote's
inability to independently evaluate claims for its client, not its failure to pursue
claims, is the actual prejudice to the Debtor, we find [the] discussion [of whether
the claim had merit] of interest but not controlling."' 4 Quoting Justice Douglas's
opinion in Woods, 5 the court concluded that "[tjhe accurate measure of preju-
dice here is not what Sirote actually did or did not do in handling Prince's case,
but rather whether Sirote could have unbiasedly made decisions in the best inter-
est of its client.""5 6 It should also be observed that the court's concern about the
failure to disclose the conflict was mentioned only in passing, and that the court's
primary concern was with the substantive failure to comply with disinterested-
ness and the negative impact that had on the ability of counsel to engage in an
unbiased investigation. '57
As Leslie Fay and Prince demonstrate, it will not be sufficient to permit the
appointment of non-disinterested counsel with the expectation that special coun-
sel can be appointed later if investigation reveals conflicts with respect to a spe-
cific issue. This is because, as an initial matter, the court will have to rely on that
counsel to conduct the initial investigation to determine whether the appointment
of a special counsel is warranted to pursue the question further. Just as any liti-
gation brought on behalf of one client against another (even in an unrelated mat-
ter) will be fatally tainted with conflicts, any investigation as to further action by
one client against another will be similarly tainted. Thus, where such a relation-
ship exists, it is proper to presume that the relationship gives rise to an adverse
interest and to disqualify counsel accordingly.
D. Uniformity, Predictability, and Consistency
The final argument made on behalf of eliminating the disinterestedness
requirement is that the current rule is fraught with fuzziness and unpredictability.
As a result, it is argued that this has confused bankruptcy lawyers, who are
unable to determine with certainty whether they are, in fact, in compliance with
the disinterestedness requirement. It is further argued that this has given rise to a
contradictory and confused body of case law which is inconsistent throughout
152. Id. at 360.
153. Id. See also Landry& Higdon, supra note 18, at 399-401.
154. Electro-Wire Prods, Inc., 40 F.3d at 360 n. 1.
155. Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust, 312 U.S. 262 (1941).
156. Electro-Wire Prods, Inc., 40 F.3d at 360.
157. Id. at 361.
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the country. It is believed that replacing the current rule with an inquiry into the
"material" nature of the conflict will eliminate the "relativities" of this analysis by
requiring the court to examine the significance of the connection or relationship.
While these concerns are unquestionably valid, eliminating the disinterested-
ness requirement and its accompanying benefits is an overbroad and unwise
solution to these problems. The problems with taking this step would be exacer-
bated by replacing the disinterestedness rule with a rule which focused on the
"materiality" of the conflict, as such a rule likely would increase unpredictability
and the role of "relativities" in the inquiry, as well as lead to greater problems of
non-uniformity.
There is a widespread perception that there is a lack of uniformity in the appli-
cation of the disinterestedness requirement throughout the country. The empiri-
cal basis for this claim is suspect, at best. 58 On closer examination, this non-uni-
formity is concentrated in only a handful of districts relative to the country as a
whole--New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago--where the courts apparently have
been more lenient in enforcing the disinterestedness requirement. To the extent
that these districts are the source of non-uniformity, it certainly is not obvious
that the solution to the problem of non-uniformity is to bring all the other dis-
tricts in the country down to the level of these districts, as compared to requiring
those districts to raise their standards up to those of the rest of the country. 159
Even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that the current approach is
characterized by ambiguity and non-uniformity, abandoning disinterestedness in
favor of a "materially adverse" standard would exacerbate these problems. As
drafted, the current rule has the virtue of being a bright-line rule which directs
the court to examine whether there is any interest adverse to the estate. Thus, the
court need only identify whether a conflict exists and need not inquire as to the
degree of that conflict. 11
Focusing on whether a conflict is materially adverse will complicate the analy-
sis significantly. Under this approach, the court will have to make fact-intensive
inquiries into two variables: (1) whether there is an adverse interest; and (2)
whether that adverse interest is material. Thus, rather than making a straightfor-
ward yes-no inquiry, under the proffered standard, the court would have to weigh
the degree of the interest in every case. Trying to quantify the materiality of the
interest in every case will increase the importance of relativities in the analysis
over the current rule. Thus, rather than eliminating or even mitigating the pur-
ported uncertainty of the current rule, searching for whether an interest is materi-
ally adverse will actually exacerbate uncertainty and non-uniformity. 181
158. See Patchan, supra note 8, at 3 ("Notwithstanding a few aberrant cases, the vast majority of Courts
have concluded that the statute means what it says and apply it accordingly.").
159. See id. ("our experience today is that the overwhelming majority of Courts apply the bright line rule in
a prompt and straightforward manner").
160. See id. ("The premise that a few Courts ignore the bright line rule does not justify, in our view, its
wholesale elimination."); Ethics, supra note 15, at 208 (statement of Joel Pelofsky).
161. See Robin, supra note 37, at 227.
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Finally, if the purported concern is that the current disinterestedness rule is too
vague and unworkable to apply consistently, one is left to speculate why these
arguments do not apply with equal force to a Chapter 11 trustee. If the legal rule
itself is the problem, should this argument not apply with equal force to a
Chapter 11 trustee? Nonetheless, no one has argued that the vagueness of the
current rule justifies its repeal for a Chapter 11 trustee, implying that the rule can
be applied predictably and uniformly in that context. Thus, one is left to specu-
late whether the purported concerns about lack of uniformity and predictability
in the debtor in possession situation are merely a stalking horse for a different
agenda.
IV FIXING DISCRETE PROBLEMS WITH DISCRETE SOLUTIONS
As a result of the foregoing arguments, the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission decided to retain the application of the disinterestedness require-
ment to counsel and professionals for a debtor in possession. At the same time,
the Commission recognized that one problem which had been caused by the
application of the disinterestedness requirement was that it often would unneces-
sarily disqualify counsel who held a claim against the estate for pre-petition ser-
vices.
"The most common basis for disqualification of a DIP's attorney is that the
attorney has a claim against the estate for pre-petition services, thereby disquali-
fying the attorney as a 'creditor' under the definition of disinterestedness." 162
This creates an anomaly in the Code in that it permits the debtor in possession to
retain pre-petition counsel under § 11 07(b), but, under § 10 1 (14)(A), defines that
counsel is not to be disinterested if he remains unpaid for pre-petition services to
the debtor. It is illogical to allow pre-petition counsel to continue representing
the debtor in bankruptcy, but not if counsel is still owed money for the pre-peti-
tion work it did. From this, some commentators have taken the illogical step of
concluding that it justifies abandonment of disinterestedness generally, so as to
avoid its application in this specific context. '63
The Commission properly rejected this extreme conclusion. Instead, the
Commission recognized that the application of disinterestedness often had the
effect of disqualifying pre-petition counsel in situations where doing so failed to
further the overall purposes of disinterestedness. Thus, the Commission has rec-
ommended carving out this scenario from the reach of the disinterestedness
requirement to the extent that pre-petition counsel is the holder of an "insubstan-
tial unsecured claim against or equity interest in the debtor." Rather than throw-
ing out the entire disinterestedness scheme to rectify one narrow problem, the
Commission's approach retains disinterestedness and carves out a narrow excep-
tion which corrects the specific problem without abandoning disinterestedness
completely. 164
162. Lieb, supra note 122, at 124.
163. See id.
164. See Robin, supra note 37, at 224 (noting that "minor" creditors and shareholders, "no matter how few
shares owned," are often disqualified under the disinterestedness requirement).
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The superiority of the Commission's approach to proposals to scrap disinterest-
edness completely is evident in its decision to limit this protection to "insubstan-
tial" claims or equity interests. This language recognizes that an exception
should be carved out to allow counsel with a pre-petition claim to continue repre-
senting the debtor, but only in circumstances where such representation would be
consistent with disinterestedness. Where counsel holds a claim which is insub-
stantial in amount in relation to the overall size of the case, the interests of the
professional are unlikely to diverge substantially from the interests of other cred-
itors and parties in the case, and the professional is unlikely to be influenced by
his interests, in a manner which would sacrifice the interests of the estate to his
private interests. As a result, the purposes of the disinterestedness requirement
would not be compromised by permitting a debtor in possession to employ pro-
fessionals who hold small claims or equity interests in the debtor. This solution
also gives effect to § 1 107(b)'s language permitting a debtor in possession to
retain pre-petition counsel, so long as consistent with the disinterestedness
requirement.
Courts had dealt with this problem in an ad hoc fashion, occasionally permit-
ting the representation only upon waiver by counsel of its pre-petition claim or
similar remedy. In practice, courts have held that a pre-petition claim disquali-
fies pre-petition counsel from serving as counsel to the debtor in possession
unless the pre-petition claim is solely the result of work done in preparation for
the bankruptcy filing. 6 But this result is far from uniform. Moreover, the pur-
poses of the disinterestedness requirement are not served by distinguishing
between a general claim for services and services incurred in preparation for fil-
ing bankruptcy. The central question is whether having the claim itself will tend
to compromise the disinterestedness of counsel. Focusing on the services which
the claim represents is irrelevant to this question.
As a result of these considerations, in the end, the Commission decided to
retain the application of the disinterestedness standard to debtors in possession,
but to amend § 1107(b) to permit employment of counsel with an insignificant
claim against the estate for pre-petition services or an insignificant equity inter-
est. This approach represents a coherent and reasonable balance between the
goals of disinterestedness, while allowing debtors in possession to retain pre-
petition counsel who have knowledge and expertise about the debtor and the
case.
V CONCLUSION
It is doubtful that the debate over disinterestedness is over. Indeed, even
though the Commission forcefully stated its support for the disinterestedness
requirement, it also admitted that there are some particular situations where off-
165. See John D. Penn & Stacey Jernigan, Survey of the Law: Disqualification of Professionals Having
Prepetition Claims, 1996-97 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 167, 168 (William L. Norton, Jr., ed. 1996).
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setting concerns justified carving out exceptions to disinterestedness, such as for
insignificant creditors or equity holders.
The Commission also considered adding a further exception to § 1107(b) for
"ceremonial" or "insignificant" officers. 166 In the end, the Commission deter-
mined that such an exception was too difficult to draft in a sufficiently clear and
narrow manner which could be applied predictability and consistently with the
goals of the disinterestedness requirement. Thus, there was no principled oppo-
sition to drafting such an exception, so long as it could be drafted in a workable
and limited manner.
Other proposals met with strong substantive objections. For instance, the
Commission considered the problems of duplication of counsel in cases where
the debtor owns multiple subsidiaries, resulting in potentially unnecessary
administrative expenses. As to this proposal, however, it was concluded that duty
of loyalty concerns justified a retention of the current approach to these ques-
tions despite the possibility that, in some cases, it might result in unnecessary
administrative expenses.
Finally, several ideas were raised, but failed because the Commission lacked
sufficient time and resources to study them further. For instance, it may be time
to revisit some of the per se exclusions enumerated in §§ 101(14)(A)-(D), most
of which were drafted in response to specific abuses under the Bankruptcy Act.
Similarly, it merits further study as to whether there are some types of secured
claims which may nonetheless be "insignificant" in light of the goals of disinter-
estedness and the proposed amendment to § 1107(b).
Upon further study, such amendments may be concluded to be appropriate or
may be rejected. Valid arguments are present on both sides of these issues.
Unfortunately, careful consideration of many of these pragmatic reforms was
headed-off by the Commission's initial decision to abandon disinterestedness
completely. This action effectively precluded a more careful review of disinter-
estedness and its requirements until the more general question was resolved. By
the time the Commission finally revisited the issue and decided to recommend
the retention of disinterestedness, it lacked the time and resources to undertake a
more detailed review of these particular issues.
As a result of these forces, the Commission was able to take action only on the
most pressing problems and least controversial amendments which had been pro-
posed, as reflected in the proposed changes in § 1107. The Commission's rash
decision to call for the elimination of the disinterestedness requirement for pro-
fessionals for a debtor in possession unfortunately foreclosed an opportunity for
meaningful review of further reforms.
Thus, the decision to retain the disinterestedness requirement for professionals
retained by a debtor in possession should not be read as a conclusion that the
current system is perfect. It is not. But it is better to identify the specific prob-
lems caused by the current system and draft reforms tailored to correcting those
problems. One need not throw out the baby with the bath water.
166. See Robin, supra note 37, at 224.
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The disinterestedness requirement furthers important policy goals, as evi-
denced by the general agreement that it is appropriate when applied to profes-
sionals retained by a trustee. It was created to deal with recurring problems of
criminality, corruption, and self-dealing which have marked the history of the
bankruptcy system and which arise from the structure of the bankruptcy system
itself. So long as these temptations remain and effective creditor oversight and
control is absent, the need for disinterestedness remains.
The disinterestedness requirement has been in place for professionals retained
by debtors in possession for almost twenty years, and for trustees for several
decades longer. The sky has not fallen. Advocates of repealing disinterestedness
for professionals representing debtors in possession simply have failed to demon-
strate that the bankruptcy system would work better without disinterestedness
than with it. Isolated problems have been identified--and then solved with dis-
crete solutions. So far, however, no one has identified any problem or problems
for which abandonment of the disinterestedness requirement for professionals
retained by the debtor in possession is the solution.
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